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Abstract
Intel Corporation's Fab 23 is committed to implementing lean manufacturing to reduce
their production cycle times and cost. This thesis is focused around the development of
the principles of lean that are most relevant to Intel's complex manufacturing flow and
then the application of these principles to improve the operations in a focused area, the
Sorting floor. Direct examination of the work in Sort raises the awareness of
inefficiencies from overproduction and inventory; viewing this work as a series of
structured activities, customer-supplier connections, and simplified flows further
crystallizes the need for a structured approach towards WIP management. A pilot
implementation of a CONWIP control of inventory demonstrates reductions in cycle time
variability and provides a foundation for further improvements. In conclusion, the
challenges experienced with changing the manufacturing systems in Sort were largely
organizational and likely to be seen in many other operational areas at Fab 23.
Thesis Supervisor: Stephen Graves
Title: Abraham J. Siegel Professor of Management
Thesis Supervisor: Daniel Whitney
Title: Senior Lecturer, MIT Engineering Systems Division
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1. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, American companies are off-shoring their manufacturing operations - a
trend which creates an uncertain economic climate domestically alongside lots of
political controversy. Amid the shakeup of globalization, one thing seems certain:
operations that are plagued with inefficiencies can and will continue to be replaced by
those which are more nimble and efficient across an international playing field.
To remain competitive in the years ahead, many manufacturers must recognize their
competitive reality and continually seek to remove the waste that has accumulated in
their processes. In many ways, this thesis research is a story about one such entity -
Intel's Fab 231 in Colorado Springs, Colorado. In benchmarking other world-class
manufacturing systems, Fab 23 is attempting to leverage principles of lean manufacturing
towards a greater competitive advantage that will sustain their long-term survival in an
increasingly competitive world.
Many pundits question the applicability of lean to the kind of complexity found within a
semiconductor production line. In response, this thesis is centered on Fab 23's
interpretation of the principles of lean - that is, fundamental laws that govern process
excellence - and the general applicability of these principles through a targeted study of
the facility's sorting operations. By experimenting with lean thinking in Sort, this
research provides a deeper understanding of the types of continuous learning, benefits,
and barriers that are unique to a lean initiative within a semiconductor environment.
1.1 Thesis Structure
A brief overview of the thesis structure is as follows:
Chapter 2 describes the history of Fab 23, the current business climate for flash memory,
and summarizes the strategic operational goals the fab needs to achieve in order to remain
competitive in the future.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the lean initiative at the fab, called Manufacturing
Excellence (or mX). The principles of mX will be described in detail along with a
summary rationale for focusing this research on the facility's sorting operations.
Chapter 4 is an overview of the Sort 23 operations, including the high-level process
flows, management structure, and economic drivers of the group.
Chapter 5 is a deeper study into the operating characteristics and latent wastes within the
sort production process. Both direct observation and statistical analyses are used to gauge
the level and severity of these different wastes while creating tension for change.
Chapter 6 presents several specific hypotheses for change towards Sort's ideal state. Each
opportunity is viewed through the lens of the mX rules i.e. seeing work as a series of
1 Fab is a term for a fabrication facility, or factory, which manufactures semiconductor products.
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structured activities, customer-supplier relationships, and simplified flows that can be
continually improved upon towards the ideal state.
Chapter 7 describes the methodology and results from an implementation of one of these
aforementioned opportunities, namely a CONWIP control of inventory to promote more
consistent and streamlined cycle times across Sort's product flows.
Chapter 8 highlights some of the key challenges experienced with changing the
manufacturing systems in Sort. The research concludes that many of the barriers to mX
remain largely organizational and are likely to be seen in many other operational areas at
Fab 23.
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2. BUSINESS BACKGROUND
"I think it's safe to say we're emerging from the worst IT/telecom recession in our
lifetime. Ahead of us are a set of opportunities unparalleled in our past."'
- Intel Capital President John Miner (Fackler, May 2004)
2.1 Fab 23 History
Fab 23 in Colorado Springs is Intel's sole manufacturing source for a mature flash
memory technology. Flash memory chips retain memory even when a device is shut off,
and they are commonly used in cell phones, digital cameras, and PDAs. Originally, Intel
purchased the factory from the Rockwell International Corporation in February of 2000
to rapidly add more manufacturing capacity in support of the booming demand for Intel
products (Intel, June 2004). Representing an investment of $1.5 billion to manufacture
not only flash memory but also logic devices, Fab 23 quickly set a new Intel record for
the fastest start up for a 200mm manufacturing site. In support of this rapid ramp, the Fab
23 employee base was expected to grow over 1,000 as the factory became fully loaded.
With the unexpected technology recession in late 2000, Fab 23 was suddenly facing a
radical change in external environment. In response to the market downturn, the fab
embarked on a cost-cutting campaign, dubbed PnL (for Profit and Loss), to coordinate
and align functional departments towards operating the factory as an autonomous
business entity within Intel's Fab and Sort Manufacturing (FSM) division. By internally
focusing on their cost accounting practices, management at Fab 23 was able to drive
more business-centric thinking across its organization, focus efforts on controllable cash
flow as a ballast against their fixed depreciation stream, and ultimately drive their cash
cost per 3K wafer start 2 down 40% over a period of 14 months. The PnL initiative was a
major factor in enabling the fab to remain viable as a single-technology supplier during
the economic recession. Significantly, the period was also noted for many lay-offs,
infrastructure shut-downs, and other painful spending cuts felt across both Fab 23 and
other Intel facilities.
2.2 Business Environment
The semiconductor industry has been steadily recovering over the last two years; the
three-month average of worldwide chip sales rose to $16.94 billion in April, 2004 - the
highest monthly level since January 2000 - and a growth of 36.6% from the previous year
(Andrey and Greenagel, June 2004). The demand for flash memory has been strong as
well, with 2003 sales volumes up almost 27% from the previous year (Kanellos,
November 2003).
The overall flash market is divided into two main technologies: NAND (for "NOT-
AND" - a reference to how data is retrieved) and NOR ("NOT- OR"). Intel, Advanced
2 A cost accounting metric used across Intel's Fab Sort Manufacturing division. 3K Wafer Start is a
standard measure of fab volume, indicating 3,000 wafers start processing over the course of a week.
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Micro Devices, and Fujitsu produce primarily NOR flash devices, which have lower
density, lower writing speed, and higher reading speeds. NOR devices are also less prone
to data corruption and are typically used to store information on cell phones, PDA's, and
set-top boxes (Kanellos, November 2003). Reciprocally, Samsung and Toshiba together
control about 90 percent of the $4.7 billion market for NAND devices, which can hold
more data than NOR, are cheaper at comparable densities, have a higher writing speeds
but slower reading speed, and are commonly used in digital camera flash cards and MP3
players (Yoon and Sorid, May 2004).
NAND is the faster growing technology, reaching 40 percent of the overall flash market
from its level of 10% two years ago ("Memory", March 2004). The shift corresponds to a
stronger relative demand for digital cameras and MP3 players and has resulted in a
turnover in market leadership; Intel had previously led the flash memory market with its
focus on NOR technology for over a decade but, in the third quarter of 2003, Samsung,
Toshiba, and Spansion (a recent joint venture between ADM and Fujitsu) all overtook the
former number one as Intel's market share dropped from 26.1% in 2002 to 13.5% market
share at the end of 2003 (Kanellos, November 2003).
Historically, scarce fab capacity worldwide has fueled high margins for the major players
in both groups of technology. However, in the spring of 2004 Samsung & Toshiba began
slashing their prices to undermine the threat of emerging rivals (Yoon and Sorid, May
2004). Additionally, benchmarking studies revealed Intel flash memory manufacturing
lagged all the high-volume manufacturers across both NAND and NOR technologies in
terms of cycle time, measured by manufacturing days per mask layer. The relative growth
of NAND technology, the aggressive build-up of production capacity by established
players, and the potential entry of new players into the NOR technology space all prove
to be threats to Intel's margins and share of the flash memory market space.
2.3 Key Takeaways
As a single-technology fab currently producing only a mature NOR technology, Fab 23
must focus on improvements in both cost and cycle time to strategically bolster its
competitiveness among both incumbent and new entrant flash memory manufacturers.
Additionally, the fab has a production commitment from Intel to manufacture an added
communications technology in the near future. In order to compete in this new market,
cycle time reductions are extremely critical, as customers in the communications market
are likely to demand radically lower lead times than Intel has traditionally been asked to
deliver.
Lean manufacturing is a well-established improvement methodology which emphasizes
both waste elimination and speed - a good match with Fab 23's strategic objectives of
lower cost and faster cycle times. Next, we will cover the nature of lean at Fab 23,
characterized by the Manufacturing Excellence (mX) initiative.
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3. OVERVIEW OF MANUFACTURING EXCELLENCE (mX)
"Compete Externally & Lead Internally"
- Recurring communication at Fab 23
In early 2003, Fab 23 collaborated with an internal benchmarking group to explore lean
manufacturing as a method to not only capture the common thinking and language that
made their recent PnL initiative a success but also drive new improvements in cost and
manufacturing cycle time. By emphasizing openness to experimentation and internal
leadership towards operations excellence, Fab 23 strives to ultimately enable Intel's Fab
and Sort Manufacturing (FSM) division to compete externally in the flash memory
market. The evolving lean initiative is dubbed Manufacturing Excellence, or mX, and
promotes change along both technical and organizational fronts.
3.1 Technical Goal
The primary technical goal of mX is to understand how 'pull' methodologies can be used
to improve the cycle times of their complex operating flow. Most generally, a pull system
prevents inventory from growing beyond a specified limit by limiting the release of work
into particular segments of a process (Hopp and Spearman, Spring 2004, p. 147). The
benefits of such disciplined flow are well documented and typically include:
1.) A means to reduce WIP and corresponding cycle time
2.) Smoother production flows for more predicable output
3.) Improved product quality with faster line velocity and a built-in intolerance for
scrap/rework
4.) Continuous reduction in manufacturing costs through the systematic exposure of
latent wastes, or "rocks" (Hopp and Spearman, Spring 2004, p. 137)
Pull methodologies have not been widely adopted in the semiconductor industry for a
variety of reasons. First, the re-entry nature of semiconductor processing flow creates a
highly-complex environment, where multiple process steps can go through a particular
toolset and even multiple toolsets that can process a single step. Secondly, the
characteristic variability in tool availability becomes a key obstacle, as unpredictable
downtimes become a significant challenge when attempting to structure the strict
inventory levels and deterministic run times intrinsic to traditional pull systems.
3.2 Cultural Goal
The primary cultural goal of mX is to engage Manufacturing Technicians (MTs) towards
systematically eradicating the waste that continually burdens their factory jobs. A
cornerstone of successful lean manufacturing systems is allowing workers to display their
capabilities in-full through active participation in running and improving their own
workshops (Toyotaproductionsys tem.net, July 2004). In order to realize this kind of
change on the floor, work standardization and structured experiments must be accepted
nonns that enforce coordinated improvements across different shifts.
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In the ideal state of mX, every employee at Fab 23 views their daily problems as
opportunities for learning and systematic waste reduction. In this vision, everyone also
uses root-cause analysis as a normal business practice, and systems-thinking is a
proliferating skill across all levels of the organization.
3.3 Implementation Strategy
3.3.1 Lean Rules & Principles (not Tools)
At the start of the initiative, the mX team experienced a few set backs. The creation of an
Improvement Suggestion Portal was intended to help engage MT's in promoting waste
elimination. However, the tool inadvertently revealed a frustrating scarcity of resources
to support the surge in improvement suggestions. Some managers also raised concerns
about the addition of a redundant improvement channel which paralleled systems already
being used. Additionally, extensive time was invested in a detailed value-stream
mapping effort which ultimately led to common-sense conclusions. Frustrated by a lack
of progress, the mX team embraced a different implementation strategy which de-
emphasizes lean tools and focuses on a shared way of thinking and learning the key
principles inherent in lean manufacturing systems.
Prior research on the Toyota Production System has concluded that the recognition and
scientific improvement of work activities, connections, and flows throughout an
organization's processes is an intrinsic strength behind Toyota's operational excellence
(Spears and Bowen, 1999, p. 98). With the counsel of the Lean Learning Center in Novi,
Michigan, Fab 23 has formalized this research into 4 rules that govern and direct new
ways of thinking about opportunities for improvement (Flinchbaugh, August 2004, p. 2):
1. Structure every activity
2. Clearly connect every customer-supplier relationship
3. Specify and simplify every flow
4. Improve through experimentation at the point of activity toward the ideal state
Here, the ideal state is defined by delivering exactly what our customer wants - exactly
when they want it, at the price they want - with zero waste and everyone safe.
Additionally, the mX team has communicated 5 principles which help provide a common
vocabulary, lens, and methodology towards the ongoing coaching and support of all mX
opportunities:
1. Directly and deeply observe the work in question to understand the current reality
2. Systematically recognize and eliminate waste
3. Systematically solve problems through the scientific method
4. Establish high agreement on the what and how of the proposed change
5. Promote a learning organization that continuously learns, applies, and reflects on
its change
14
These rules and principles of mX are summarized into a "House of mX" schematic,
shown in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: The "House" of Manufacturing Excellence (W) principles.
Ideal
_0 4State
Aply Larn.
towards the ideal X
3.3.2 Pulling in Change on two fronts: "Mile-Wide, Inch-Deep" and "Inch-Wide, Mile-
Deep"
In early 2004, the mX initiative was being directed by a core of four managers who
devoted a significant portion of their time to coaching the rules and principles of lean. As
a means to further proliferate this new way of thinking, the core team organized and
trained a set of mX Champions to identify key mX opportunities and drive tactical
improvements through the coaching, experimentation, and reflection of mX rules and
principles in their home functional areas. By targeting troublesome, ongoing problems
with mX thinking, Champions could start to solve thorny issues, credit their lean thinking
with the success, and hence generate more interest and demand for further mX thinking
among their constituents (Klein, October 2004). This approach encompasses the mX core
team's "Mile-wide, Inch Deep" campaign.
In parallel, an "Inch-Wide, Mile Deep" initiative was pursued. In this strategy, a subset of
operations within the entire flash memory manufacturing line can be selected as an
isolated area for open experimentation and deeper learning about lean. In surveying
possible candidates, the facility's Sorting operations were selected as Fab 23's first mX
Learning Lab for several reasons:
- Sort 23 has been consistently rated the best Sort operation within Intel in terms of
highest equipment utilization and lowest cost per wafer-sorted in recent years.
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This history and confidence for success led to a high willingness to experiment
with lean among the Sort 23 personnel.
- Flash Memory Sorting is a relatively simple process flow with only a few re-entry
loops. Equipment availability is also very high, and the processing times across
operations are consistent. These conditions lend to a favorable, stable
environment in which experiments with WIP management and pull
methodologies could be explored.
- The flexibility in micro-contamination regulations and clean-room standards
presents significantly lower barriers towards implementing any layout changes,
visual controls, or visual flow solutions that may be generated from lean thinking.
3.4 Thesis Focus
At the tactical level, the LFM internship was an opportunity to participate in the Sort
Learning Lab to help identify and resolve ongoing problems through the use of mX rules
and principles. The methodology for this research work was as follows:
1. The work in Sort was directly observed in order to gain an appreciation and sense
for the type and quantity of waste in the area.
2. The mX rules of structured activities, customer-supplier connections, and
simplified flows were applied to target latent inefficiencies and generate new
opportunities for improving both cost and cycle time.
3. A tactical experiment targeting one of the key opportunities, WIP control, was
then structured and implemented.
4. The results of the experiment were interpreted for further learning and refinement
of the change.
Ideally, this scientific approach towards cost & cycle time improvements could be
learned from and replicated to other areas in the Fab/Sort production line at Fab 23 for
further mX proliferation.
Before directly embarking on the direct observation of the wastes in Sort, however, a
brief overview of both the process complexity of flash memory sorting and the formal
organization of the Sort 23 group is important.
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4. FLASH MEMORY SORTING OPERATIONS
"Folks usually feel Sort is somewhat simple compared to the fab operations. The reality
is very different... and the complexity is always a challenge for us to manage."
- Sort 23 Operating Manager
In order to provide a good context for the research undertaken for the thesis, an overview
of the processes, organization, and cost structure of Sort 23 is provided. Hopefully, the
reader may also gain some appreciation for the daily complexity that confronts this
Operating Manager!
4.1 Sort Processing
The purpose of a "sort" operation is to separate good and bad wafers and individual die
thereon, taking wafers in from upstream fab operations and forwarding them to final
manufacturing steps. Sort 23 receives its wafers 3 from two upstream fab operations: Fab
23 in Colorado Springs and Fab 11 in Rio Rancho, New Mexico. After processing the
wafers, Sort then delivers the fully-sorted lots to a series of downstream Assembled Die
Inventory (ADI) warehouses (which supply Intel's Assembly and Test operations with
incoming inventory). Figure 4.1 shows how Sort 23's inputs and outputs fit within a
greater context of Intel's flash memory supply chain.
Figure 4.1: Intel's networked flow for P803 & P804 process technologies. Sort 23 receives unsorted wafers from
both Fab 23 and Fab 11 for testing & subsequent delivery to an Assembled Die Inventory (ADI).
Fab 23 in Colorado Sort 23
Springs, Colorado - (P803
(P803 Wafers) &P804) Assembly Test
A (Die) -p (Die) C
Fab 11 in Rio Rancho, Sort 11
New Mexico (P804)
(P804 Wafers)
The wafers from both Fab 23 and Fab 11 arrive in lot sizes of 25. Depending on the
wafers' upstream origin, Sort must then continue processing these lots through one of two
standardized manufacturing processes, referred to as the P803 and P804 process
technologies. In Sort, each of these process technologies is a fixed series of operations
that enforce the following responsibilities:
1.) Test and remove wafers with out-of-spec electrical connection properties.
2.) Program memory functionality within each flash memory die.
3.) Stabilize the die's electrical properties and force a failure of any marginal die.
4.) Provide valuable end-of-line data for feedback to upstream operations in the fabs.
3 A wafer is a silicon disc approximately 1 mm thick and 200 mm in diameter. Wafers are used to form the
substrate of each flash memory die. Each wafer may produce a quantity of die devices ranging from several
hundred to a few thousand, depending on the die product's type and size.
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5.) Electronically 'mark' any non-functional die in preparation for the downstream
Assembly operations.
Notably, the P03 and P804 process technologies each have a different process flow to
handle the unique characteristics of different flash memory designs.
4.1.1 Process Technology P803
Figure 4.1.1 shows the sorting process flow for the P803 technology products. First, all
lots are taken through an E-Test process, where the interface structures created between
the die during fabrication are tested for functionality. The data gathered at E-Test is
compared to nominal process values; out-of-spec material is either immediately scrapped
or placed on hold for further investigation depending on the reason for failure.
Figure 4.1.1 Sort Process Flow for P803 Technology
E-Test Pre- Sort 1 Bake Sort 2 Pack &
Bake Ship
Fab 23 Ship to
Delivery ADI
From E-test, the lots move to the first Pre-Bake operation. Bake operations stress
marginal die to encourage failure as electrical charge is stabilized within each memory
cell.
Thereafter, a lot is brought to the first sorting operation (Sort 1). Sort 23 operates a total
of 63 sorting testers which have the flexibility to process any sorting operation (i.e. Sort 1
or Sort 2) on any process technology (P803 or P804). At each of these sort operations, the
testing program, or Test Tape, checks that each individual die is functional. Die that fail
are classified into bins based on the test which caused them to fail. The bin distribution of
die on a wafer is another indicator which can cause material to be put on hold for further
investigation by engineering. All sort test results are then loaded into a database system,
and non-functional die are mapped in a computerized file that allows downstream
assembly operations to discriminate between die which should be scrapped and die which
should be processed further.
After the first Sort operation, an additional Bake operation is required to further stabilize
the electrical charges. After the second Bake step, the wafers go through a second sorting
operation (Sort 2) which not only checks die functionality but also programs each die
with the necessary memory logic.
The final operation, Pack and Ship, prepares the wafers for shipment to the appropriate
ADI site.
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4.1.2 Process Technology P804
Figure 4.1.2 shows the sorting process flow for the P804 technology products. Cross-site
wafers arrive at Fab 23 ready for processing at the Sort 1 operation. Two subsequent
Bake-Sort processing loops are then required to fully stabilize, program, and test die
functionality. Again, the same 63 sorting testers have the flexibility to handle any of the
Sort 1, Sort 2A, or Sort 2 operations. The final operation, Pack and Ship, is identical with
both the P803 and P804 technologies.
Figure 4.1.2 Sort Process Flow for P804 Technology
Sort 1 Bake Sort 2A Bake Sort 2 Pack &
Ship
Fab 11 Ship to
Delivery ADI
4.1.3 The Product Mix of P803 and P804 Processing
Fab 23 is currently a single-technology fab, supplying Sort with a varying suite of
between three to nine products within the P803 process technology. Although Fab 11
manages more than one process technology in their operations, they only supply Sort 23
with between two and three flash memory products from their P804 technology process.
Although the product mix can change over time, a larger majority of Sort's throughput
volume is for the P803 flash products (approximately 82% of the wafers output during
March and April of 2004 were P803). Note that although the throughput volume is
smaller for the P804 products, the additional sort operation required for 804 technology
leads to nearly 50% of the sorting tester capacity allocated to P804 on any given week.
In a way, Sort separates two very different manufacturing environments at Intel. As
Sort's supplier of production material, both wafer fabrication facilities principally
manage their product flow in lots which are segmented by process technology. Intel's
Assembly and Test facilities have the most-immediate need for product from the Sorting
operation; these customers require delivery of functional die segmented by product to
feed their ADI levels. Sort operations then face a weekly challenge of connecting a
downstream demand for product-specific die with an upstream supply of process
technology-centric wafer lots.
4.1.4 Lot Handling & Changeovers
All wafer lots are loaded and moved between equipment sets manually. To facilitate
manual handling, there are WIP racks nearby each of these processes in order to stage
incoming lots.
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The E-test and Sort tester operations require that equipment be setup differently for each
product type. When a different product is run at these operations, several activities must
be performed:
1. The correct software program, or 'Test Tape', must be loaded
2. The unique hardware interface, or probe-card, must be available and installed
onto the equipment
3. The tester must be brought to the correct operating temperature.
The product-specific test programs can be substantially different due to programming
logic and number of die per wafer, resulting in differing processing times across
products. Typically, product changeovers require between 7 and 13 minutes of tester
downtime to complete depending on the range and direction of temperature change
(heating the tester cell is faster than cooling). Changing a tester to operate on a different
process technology is essentially the same as a product-to-product changeover in this
regard.
In the case of purely flexing a Sort tester over to a different sorting operation (i.e. from
Sort 1 to Sort 2 with no change in product-type), a probe-card change is not required.
However, the required temperature change between sorting operations is typically more
significant, raising the required tester downtime to between 5 and 45 minutes depending
on the direction of the necessary temperature change.
4.2 Organizational Structure
The Sort 23 organization is a relatively small department, consisting of a Department
Manager, two Operating Managers who directly manage 4 shifts of Manufacturing
Technicians, and two teams of Process and Equipment Engineers (see Figure 4.2). Sort is
also supported by several Automation & Industrial Engineering resources who normally
work during the daytime-shifts, Monday through Friday.
Figure 4.2: Sort 23 Organization
AllocaEe Fsb/Sort Prce boductil n Operating Manager Operatin Manager
(Days & Nights for I' half of (Days & Nights for 2nd hal of
AouWgg0* & Equipment Engineers Process Engineers Shift Shift
ttrw sationSfymorng
Support Staff Manufacturing Technicians Manutacturdng Technicians
Industrial Engineers
-Manufacturing Technicians Manutacturing Technicians
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The Operating Managers (OMs) split production responsibilities across the first half
(front-half) and second half (back-half) portions of each week. Each OM formally covers
both the day and nighttime shifts but tend to split the majority of their 12 hour work-days
with the day-shift. About eight Manufacturing Technicians (MTs) are assigned per day
shift and five per night shift. All the MTs share responsibility for operating and
maintaining the production equipment on the floor as well as the manual moving and
loading of lots. Within these teams, one or two experienced MTs are designated as Area
Coordinators (ACs) with additional responsibilities of coordinating daily operating
activities both within a shift as well as across other shifts.
4.3 Sort Economics & Metrics
Sort's major sources of cost are three-fold:
1.) Payroll
2.) Probe-card inventory purchases
3.) Depreciation of capital from both equipment and building investments
Other operating costs, such as energy consumption, clean room support, and repair tools
are not significant expenditures relative to these categories. Payroll and probe card
inventory make up approximately 1/3 rd of the total cost of running Sort 23, whereas non-
cash depreciation of equipment and building make-up approximately 2 /3rds
Intel benchmarks their internal operations on a dollar per wafer cost basis. For Sort 23,
this means their aggregate costs of payroll, probe card purchases, and depreciation are
divided by the volume of good wafers sorted each month to generate a summary
performance measure. This cost per sorted-wafer metric is then used to rank Sort 23
among other sort operations within Intel. Notably, measures of WIP inventory and cycle
time performance are not key benchmarking metrics within the group.
The heavy emphasis on the floor's cost-per-wafer drives tester utilization as a critical
success indicator for Sort 23, as maximizing this bottleneck resource is a sound approach
to maximize output volume. Additionally, Intel coordinates its production volumes across
a network of distributed fab/sort manufacturing capacity. Across this Virtual Factory, or
VF, Sort tester capacity is also designed as a bottleneck constraint; Sort 23 is encouraged
to maintain high tester utilizations for this reason as well.
Working with the fab operations, Sort 23 must sort wafers according to a production
schedule. Each week, the Fab/Sort collaboration strives to deliver all the planned product
volumes (and hence scoring a 100% LIPAS metric 4).
4 Line Item Performance As Scheduled (LIPAS) is a binary (two-state) performance metric used in
reference to product schedules which are either being met on time or not.
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4.4 Key Takeaways
Clearly, Sort 23 is responsible for a complex workflow, as managing the delivery of
multiple products across multiple re-entrant processes through a flexible pool of sorting
testers is a puzzling challenge. In contrast to this operational complexity, the group has a
very simple, unifying goal: maximize tester utilizations subject to meeting all the weekly
product schedules. As we will see, this focused coordination has enabled Sort 23 to out-
perform its Intel peers in terms of the cost per wafer-sorted metric - making the prospect
for further waste identification somewhat daunting.
However, the principle of directly observing the work towards waste discovery can be a
powerful method to see outside existing paradigms of success and raise the awareness of
latent inefficiencies. Thus, our next chapter will be an attempt to assess and quantify an
objective reality of the Sort 23 operations.
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5. DIRECT OBSERVATION OF THE CURRENT REALITY
"There are many examples of waste in the workplace, but not all waste is obvious. It
often appears in the guise of useful work. We must see beneath the surface and grasp the
essence."
- Shigeo Shingo (Shingo and Robison, 1991, p. 83)
Since everyday data and metrics are abstractions from a complex reality, a central
principle of mX is to continually re-examine the work in question in order to discover
and understand the latent wastes within the system. mX advocates the use of two
discovery tools which facilitate this kind of deep and direct observation:
* Activity Mapping
" Product/Process Mapping
These tools are helpful in channeling direct observations into a greater context of "what
usually happens" in a given process flow and then looking for opportunities to eliminate
waste. However, the tools fail to include an understanding of the significance and sources
ofprocess variability. Hence, additional statistical data covering various characteristics
of the Sort operation is also presented here, including:
" Variability in Cycle Times
" Tester Utilizations
" Rework Rates
" Product Delivery Rates from Fab 23
" Production Scheduling Dynamics
Finally, descriptions of the current methods for Tester Capacity and WIP Management
are provided.
5.1 Activity Mapping
The Activity Map defines who is involved in the manufacturing process and how long
each of their activities takes. Through direct time study, a typical map shows the time
each employee must contribute to a process item or product as the item progresses
through a series of standardized steps. For example, mapping a typical lunch-order
process in a restaurant might show 1.) a 15 minute block for the customers to decide on
their selections, then 2.) a 5 minute block for the waiter to receive their order and take it
to the kitchen 3.) a 10 minute block for the cook to receive the order and prepare the
food, and finally 4.) a 5 minute block for the waiter to deliver the food back to the
customer.
Applying the Activity Map methodology to Sort reveals a much more nimble work
environment for the Manufacturing Technicians; the number and variety of the daily MT
activities in Sort vary constantly depending on equipment-related problems, number of
tester loads or changeovers required that day, and number of lots awaiting E-test or
shipping. A snapshot of three Technicians shows about 80% of their total shift was
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consumed by direct manufacturing activities such as moving lots, firefighting problems,
and equipment maintenance. The remaining 20% of time was dedicated towards
administrative tasks, lunches, and breaks. Notably, the timing and coordination of these
activities were mostly unstructured and keyed by equipment malfunctions and lot-
completion events. However, Manufacturing Technicians are allowed a high-degree of
autonomy in scheduling their daily tasks around these events, and most Technicians take
pride in managing their time productively.
5.2 Product/Process Mapping
The Product/Process map depicts what typically happens to a product during the
production process. With different processing times and process steps across the two
different technologies, two different maps are generated to capture the current reality.
Figure 5.2 shows the mappings for both P803 and P804 process technologies based on
median operating times for 20 weeks in early 2004.
Figure 5.2: Product/Process Maps
P804 < .
CoD
P803
1L m
Median Cycle Times
The maps show the most significant wait times occur before the Sort operations,
reaffirming tester capacity as the floor's bottleneck constraint. Also, approximately half
of the total cycle time is from waiting for an available sort tester (56% for P803 and 49%
for P804).
5.3 Variability in Cycle Times
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A statistical analysis of cycle times was conducted for all the lots processed at Sort 23 for
20 weeks. Figures 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 show the 1", 2 "d, and 3rd quartile for this sample data
for each process technology.
Figure 5.3.1: Cycle Time Variability for P803
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Figure 5.3.2: Cycle Time Variability for P804
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Significantly, the largest source of variability appears in the queue times before the sort
operations. The variability in wait time before Sort 1 appears to be especially significant,
suggesting further variability in the arrival of product from the upstream fab operations.
Note the distribution of Sort processing time can be principally attributed to focused
differences in processing time per product family, as shown in Figures 5.3.3 through
5.3.5.
Figure 5.3.3: Variability in Sort 1 Process Time
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Figure 5.3.4: Variability in Sort 2A Process Times
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Figure 5.3.5: Variability in Sort 2 Process Times
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5.4 Tester Utilizations
Sort 23's utilization measure is defined by the amount of time the floor's sorting tester
equipment is processing a lot (excluding setup times) divided by the total time the
equipment is qualified5 to run the product, or arithmetically:
Utilization = Time Sorting Wafers
Total Time
For each of Sort's tester models (VHP and AGT), the average weekly utilization metric is
calculated as:
Numberoftesters #Wafersprocessed
Z I Time Sorting each Wafer
Weekly Utilization =
Number of Testers x 168 hours / week
Examining weekly utilization levels (indexed against internal benchmarks, where 1.0
equals target performance) shows consistently high metrics for its fleet of 60 VHP testers
but sporadic dips for its three AGT testers (Figure 5.4.1). Clearly, this metric is sensitive
to the total number of testers within a model category. For example, in WW26 one of the
AGT testers failed a maintenance diagnostic and experienced considerable down time
from delayed troubleshooting and re-qualification. This single incident caused the AGT
utilization to plummet to around 0.75, yet an equivalent downtime on a VHP model tester
would only register as a 0.02 drop in that model's weekly utilization (indexed).
Figure 5.4.1 Weekly Utilizations for VHP and AGT Tester Models
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1.0
0.9
(0
0.8
0.7
0.6
WWOB WWIO WWO12 WW14 ww1e WW18 WW20 WW22 WW24 WW26 WW28 WW30 WW32
---+- VHP Testers (60) - s - -AGT Testers (3)
5 Qualification is an engineering process that certifies individual testers as capable of performing particular
processes on particular products. Only equipment which has been qualified may be used to produce product
for shipment to customers and hence is included as part of utilization.
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One of the ways Sort maximizes its utilization metric is by minimizing the lost
production time from tester changeover activity. For example, assume a sort tester is
setup to run product A with product B already waiting to be tested. If a product A arrives
and there is no imminent need for more of product B, the new product A will be loaded
onto the equipment ahead of the waiting product B to save a setup changeover from
occurring. Similarly, a sort tester processing Sort 1 will continue to operate on Sort 1
until a pressing need requires a change to Sort 2A or Sort 2.
As mentioned before, changeovers
can vary from 5 to 45 minutes
depending on the range and direction
of the operating temperature change.
With only a handful of changeovers
occurring each shift, the lost tester
time typically amounts to between 0.1
% and 0.4 % of the total tester
availability (see Figure 5.4.2 for
complete breakdown of tester
availability).
Figure 5.4.2: Breakdown of Logbook Data by Tester Status
RUNNING PRODUCT 94.35%
DOWN 2.80%
IN REPAIR 1.38%
MAINTENANCE 0.45%
WAITING PRODUCT 0.31%
ENGINEERING 0.26%
CHANGEOVER 0.21%
WAITING PART 0.13%
WAITING TECHNICIAN 0.06%
MAINTENANCE OVERDUE 0.04%
Total Tester Time 100%
(Data taken from all VHP Testers for 1' 14 weeks of 2004).
5.5 Rework Rates
Rework at Sort 23 is defined by the redundant processing time spent re-sorting a wafer.
Figure 5.5 shows the percentage of rework time over total processing time for a period of
nearly 5 months. Intel plans for 0.3% rework rates in each of their Sorting operations,
which approximately matches the mean values of the observed data.
Figure 5.5 Sort Rework Rates
1.4
1.2
I0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
4
WWO6 WW07 WWO8 WWO9 WW10 WW11 WW12 WW13 WW14 WW1 WW16 WW17 WW18 WW19 WW20 WW21 WW22 WW23 WW24
I Sort 1 -A- Sort 2A --O- Sort 2
29
I
5.6 Fab 23 Planning and Product Delivery to Sort 23
Each week, Fab 23 starts manufacturing a certain number of wafers per product with a
planned lead time of 8 weeks before delivery to Sort. Sort then has a two-week lead time
in which to process these wafers and deliver the scheduled die quantities to ADI. Hence,
the fab wafer starts are always based on what ADI will need 10 weeks in the future; die-
schedules oftentimes change during this lag period. Indeed, schedules may change even
before a few days of being due. So as the last set of operations before ADI delivery (and
LIPAS scoring), Sort has a de-facto responsibility to monitor and meet these changing die
schedules on a weekly basis.
Figures 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 show the delivery of Fab 23's wafers into Sort 23 during each
shift as well as aggregated over a weekly horizon for a period of 17 weeks. Wafer arrivals
appear to be highly-variable from shift-to-shift yet roughly consistent on a weekly tally.
Notably, fab operations emphasize the execution of wafer delivery, or 'fab outs', on a
weekly basis.
Figure 5.6.1 Fab 23 Delivery Rates to Sort 23
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Figure 5.6.2 Fab 23 Delivery Rates to Sort 23
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In order to satisfy its weekly die-out targets, Sort 23 must allocate their tester capacity by
product type and sorting operation. Figure 5.6.3 shows how the delivery of wafers from
Fab 23 corresponds to the product-specific loadings necessary for Sort 23 to meet their
schedules within their two week lead time. As a customer, Sort sees large swings in the
delivery of products from their fab supplier - a dynamic one technician describes as
'feast or famine'.
Figure 5.6.3 Fab Delivery Performance by Product*
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Since only a subset of products are scheduled on any given week, many product volumes are intermittently absent.
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While both Fab and Sort Operations Managers reference common information reports
detailing daily product delivery status from the fab, the communication pathways
between the groups are numerous (emails, phone calls, and meetings), complex
(involving dozens of Technicians, several Operating Managers, Planning personnel, and
Industrial Engineering liaisons), and crippled by delays; at the point in time when a Sort
Technician communicates a need for more Trumbull 32, the Fab managers might easily
require 3 to 7 weeks to adjust the delivery rate for this product. This gap in customer-
supplier connection leads not only to variability in product inventory levels on the Sort
floor but also frustration on the part of Sort personnel to maintain predictable flow to
fulfill die schedules.
For the time interval examined, there appears to be more product volume delivered
weekly from the fab than is actually needed by Sort's downstream customer, ADI. As an
extreme example, the fab delivered approximately ten times the amount of Trumbull 64
in WW1 5 than was necessary to fulfill schedules (only to be balanced by a deficit of 2.5x
the next week)! As we will see next, these excessive inflows may cause surges in Sort
inventory levels in the near term yet support a steady practice of overproducing beyond
scheduled amounts over the longer term.
Since the size of ADI inventories remains manageable at Intel despite this
overproduction, one might argue that the final die schedules are systematically
underestimating the real demand of the downstream Assembly operations on ADI. Given
the time interval and scope of this thesis research, however, this conclusion is difficult to
confirm.
5.7 Production Scheduling Dynamics
Twice a week, each Sort Operations Manager and daytime Area Coordinator meets with
the department's Industrial Engineer and a representative from the Fab 23's planning
group to discuss anticipated production volumes and product mix over a 2-7 week
horizon. Schedule changes from ad-hoc customer requests, changes in fab yields, run
times, and equipment availability are all coordinated across these groups during these
meetings. Information on the latest schedule is then communicated to the floor by both
the OM and AC through email, shift-to-shift pass-down meetings, and informal
discussions.
As an example of these changes, Figure 5.7.1 shows the production schedules for the
Trumbull product categories over a period of 18 weeks. The planned product volumes (in
wafers, indexed) are broken down into three sequential snapshots in time:
1.) The schedules as they appear two weeks before LIPAS is due
2.) The same schedules once 'fixed' a week before LIPAS is due, and finally
3.) The final volumes delivered to ADI
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Figure 5.7.1 Schedule Changes and Final Production Volumes
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Two interesting trends emerge from this viewpoint. First, as delivery dates become more
immediate (i.e. the horizon closes from 2 weeks to 1 week), the scheduled volumes seem
to drop across many of the product categories and weeks. However, comparing these
final 'fixed' schedules to the volumes that Sort actually delivers to ADI shows a
systematic trend in Sort consistently delivering wafers beyond the final schedule
amounts.
One key reason for this dynamic stems from a policy of accruing all overproduction as
credit in future week's schedules. For example, if Sort ships 100 die of Trumbull 128
beyond their weekly target, then planning will lower their production schedule by 100
units the subsequent week. On the one hand, the practice of shipping ahead of schedule
allows Sort to smooth large peaks in scheduled demand through early accruals, mitigating
large fluxes in tester changeovers. On the other hand, overproduction is a clear signal that
schedules are lax relative to the output performance of the floor. Notably, Sort only
missed a final die schedule three times over the course of 18 weeks studied; if Sort were
held to the die schedules set two-weeks away from the delivery due dates, they would
have missed their schedules 56 times!
Since overproduction is a normal practice, a tier catalogue is used to coordinate the
product priorities from delivery to ADI across all of Intel's Fab/Sort operations. Figure
5.7.2 shows how tier assignments optimize output levels across product categories
subject to scheduling volumes.
Figure 5.7.2 Tier Priorities for Product Delivery to ADI
Priority Description
Tier I Maximize output. Subordinate other schedules to overship if possible.
Tier 2 Hit schedules. Once schedule is hit, do not subordinate Tier 3 schedules to overship schedules.
Tier 3 Maximize performance to schedule. But not at expense of Tier 1 & 2 expectations.
Tier 4 Prioritize behind Tier 1-3. Only run if you have idle testers or you are on track to make all Tier 3 schedules.
Hence, an over-shipment of Tier 3 product while missing a Tier 2 schedule would
constitute a misallocation of tester capacity for Sort 23. It is difficult to measure how
strictly Sort performs to these guidelines given the complex variables that determine each
product's overproduction; the tier catalog prioritization must be considered alongside any
future peaks in schedule volume (spurring early accruals and smoother production
volumes across multiple weeks) as well as limits from the delivery of product from the
fab (constraining the amount of accrual possible).
As a rough gauge of performance, Figure 5.7.3 shows the tier priorities and Sort's over-
shipments during weeks 15 and 16 across all products. From this limited perspective, Sort
23 appears to be lax in adhering to the tier priorities rules; the excess delivery of
Armagosa 32 above schedules is especially suspicious when ranked against the higher-
priority, lower-volume delivery of Trumbull 32.
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Figure 5.7.3 Overproduction across Tier Priorities in Work Week 15 and 16
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5.8 Capacity Management Systems
The Sort Area Coordinators have developed spreadsheets that estimate the minimum
number of testers that must be setup on each product and each sort operation to fulfill the
current mix of die schedules. Given a series of sorting operations i and products j, the
tester estimates for any given week can be calculated as follows:
Let
Qj = the remaining quantity of scheduled die for product j
Rij = process time required to sort each wafer of product j at sorting operation i
Dj = the fixed die-per-wafer ratio
Yj = the historical die yield for product j
T = the amount of time left before the delivery due date
The whole number tester estimate Sij for each sorting operation i and product j is
SU = ROUND U DY
where the total sum of available testers must not be exceeded, or
Sorting To talI#of
Operations Pr oducts
I I SU (total sort testers)
i=1 j=1
Notably, fractional tester quantities are always rounded up to promote over (versus
under) production. The capacity estimates also assume 100% tester utilizations, 0%
resorting rates, and deterministic run rates and die yields. Given these uncertainties, the
model is iteratively updated with quantities Qj throughout the week as production due
dates advance and time horizon T decreases.
For example, let's assume product A has 200 die per wafer, product B has 750 die per
wafer, and that each product has an historical yield of 85% and 95%, respectively.
Furthermore, let's assume we know that the run times for the Sort 1 and Sort 2 operations
are 1 and 2 hours per wafer for product A and 1.5 and 3.5 hours per wafer for product B.
Finally, at a time of 168 hours before schedules are due we have 625,000 die of product
A and 435000 die of product B yet to deliver:
Product Die per Historical Run time per Run time per Remaining
() Wafer Die Yield wafer for Sort 1 wafer for Sort 2 Die Due (Q)
(Di) (Yi) (Ri=1) (Ri=2)
A 200 85% 0.75 hours 1 hour 625,000
B 750 95% 2 hours 3.5 hours 435,000
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Sort would then allocate testers to produce products A and B as follows:
A = ROUND U4 625,000 good die x 0.75 hours ! wafer =17testers
168 hours x 200 die ! wafer x 0.85 good die / die)
S2A = ROUND U4  625,000 good die x I hours / wafer = 22 testers
168 hours x 200 die /wafer x 0.85 good die/die)
SIB = ROUND U 4  43 5,000 good die x 2 hours / wafer = 8testers
U 168 hours x 750die / waferx 0.85 good die/ die)
B= ROUND U~ 43 5,000 good die x 3.5 hours / wafer = 13 testers
168 hours x 750 die! wafer x 0.85 good die/die)
Here, the total number of fully-allocated testers required to fulfill the schedules for
product A and B is 60 - three testers below Sort's capacity constraint of 63. Similarly,
when scheduled demand is below tester capacity, some quantity of testers in Sort will not
be accounted for in this model. In this case, the Area Coordinators then work with the
Operating Manager to allocate these spare testers based on a judgment of any low WIP
levels in front of the Sort 1, Sort 2, and Sort 2A operations or a preference to strategically
over-produce a given product.
Notably, the time horizon used for these spare allocation decisions is inconsistent across
the shifts. As a rule, the front-end of the week does not look beyond the current week's
schedule in making allocation judgments. By comparison, the shifts on the back-end of
each week take both the current and thefollowing week's schedules into account when
allocating spare testers. For example, the Trumbull 32 volume might jump by 30% in the
subsequent week's schedule. In this case, the back-end of the week would allocate spare
tester capacity on Sortl and Sort2 operations for Trumbull 32 in order to over-ship during
the current week and thus lower next week's spike in volume. The front-end of the week
would most likely ignore this upcoming spike and allocate the spare tester capacity on a
Tier 1 or Tier 2 product.
5.9 WIP Management Policies
Within a product category, Sort follows FIFO processing at all operations. Expediting
lots outside this discipline is rare and makes up a negligible percent of total output
volume. However, during extreme schedule pressure for a specific product, the floor will
split lots into smaller batches in order to accelerate the sort processing times. This
practice is strongly discouraged, as it leads to more ad-hoc work for the Manufacturing
Technicians and an increased risk of mis-processing a lot.
In order to manage WIP across the process flows, the Sort Area Coordinators use a
customized spreadsheet which summarizes the number of lots and wafers at each process
operation by individual product family. The tool promotes a reactionary approach to WIP
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management, as noticeable dips and peaks in current WIP levels are continually
'smoothed' through the aforementioned re-allocation of spare tester capacity.
Indeed, the cycle time variability at the Sort 1, Sort 2A, and Sort 2 operations can be seen
as consequences of this unstructured management activity. Little's Law is an equation
that shows the relationship between average WIP, cycle time, and the throughput of any
production system (Hopp and Spearman, 1996):
WIP = (Throughput) * (Cycle Time)
Since Sort fills the capacity of their testers to the point of over-production, their
throughput levels remain nearly constant; the ad-hoc control of WIP levels at Sortl, Sort
2A, and Sort2 can then be mathematically linked to cycle time variability shown in
Figures 5.3.1 and 5.3.2.
When pressed for a formal methodology to WIP management, one Sort technician
declared, "We try to push as much inventory into Sort2 to hedge ourselves against any
surprise increases in [production schedules]. That way, our product is in a position to be
delivered rapidly. In reality, we are always faced with changing mix of production
volumes and sporadic wafer delivery from the fab, making any structured approach to
WIP management extremely difficult."
5.10 Key Takeaways
In summary, Figure 5.10 breaks down the major directly-observed areas of waste
alongside Intel's current management systems and the alignment of that waste's
eradication with the fab's strategic objectives.
Figure 5.10 Comparison of the observed sources of waste at Sort 23
Area of Waste Relative Management Current Strategic
Level System Metric Alignment
Direct Labor Medium MT Autonomy Annual Lower cost per
Productivity evaluations wafer
Production High Industrial Throughput Cycle time
Waiting Times Engineering Models times reduction
Equipment Low Base Tester Weekly Lower cost per
Utilization Allocations Utilization wafer
Rework Low Industrial Resort Rates Lower cost per
Engineering Models wafer
Delivery from High Pull Station Days behind Cycle time
the fab Reporting (schedule) reduction
Overproduction High Tier priority catalog None Cycle time
to ADI reduction
Inventory High Spare Tester None Cycle time
Allocations reduction
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Directly examining the operational characteristics of Sort reveals some key aspects of
their past success. For example, the group's performance in minimizing rework and
maximizing tester utilization has kept their operating costs well below their nearest
internal rivals. And despite the variable influx of product volumes from the fab, Sort
leverages base capacity estimates to continually allocate their tester resources towards
shifting production schedules, enabling the Fab 23-Sort 23 collaboration to rarely miss a
LIPAS goal.
However, the observed data also shows a significant waste of overproduction from lax
scheduling. Decisions on allocating the resulting spare testers are unstructured across the
shifts, and the management of inventory flow is largely reactionary. In evaluating the
opportunities for mX improvement, these sources of waste stand out; cost per wafer is a
deeply-entrenched measure of success at Sort 23, but cycle time reductions lie outside
most of the current management systems (as well as the group's paradigm for success).
The next chapter will critically examine these latent sources of waste through the use of
mX thinking and principles.
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6. HYPOTHESES FOR CHANGE TOWARDS THE IDEAL STATE
"It's easy to read these [lean rules] and think, "We've already done that. We have a book
of standards; we've developed process maps for the flows; we know the customer of
every process - so what's new?"
- Jamie Flinchbaugh (Flinchbaugh, August 2004, p. 3)
In striving to be the lowest-cost sorting operation at Intel, Sort 23 already typifies the
focus on waste elimination and scientific improvement inherent in lean systems.
Accordingly, many Sort personnel have often asked the question, "So what about mX is
new?"
The answer to this challenge lies in a difference in the level of depth to which mX rules
must be applied. Most of Sort's current improvements fall comfortably within current
paradigms - that is, most everyone in Sort would agree and immediately recognize the
value that these projects generate for their department. For example, it's relatively
straightforward to see how an effort to speed up process times (or diagnose an equipment
malfunction, or even rush to feed an idle tester) is valuable towards eliminating wasted
capacity, raising throughput, and hence lowering the cost per wafer sorted. In contrast,
the value in the following set of activities may not be immediately obvious:
- Experimenting with a strict WIP flow even when it requires an immediate
increase in changeovers, more direct labor, and an overall decrease in available
tester capacity.
- Adhering to a consensus production plan when yield unexpectedly drops and an
ad-hoc effort would enable a quick boost in the delivery of a critical product.
- Strict adoption of another shift's maintenance protocol when there's a conviction
that your shift does it more efficiently.
When applied regularly to the thousands of daily scenarios and decisions within a factory,
the mX rules can generate a powerful shift in how a manufacturing organization sees
itself and its quest for improvement. Structures, connections, and flows become thinking
norms which ultimately demand experimenting with the kind of disciplined challenges
and non-intuitive improvement activities outlined above.
In this chapter, we present and discuss a series of improvement suggestions for each mX
rule; many of these hypotheses fall outside of Sort 23's paradigms for improvement yet
are essential for reducing the cycle time of the manufacturing system. Critically, these
ideas all create palpable tension towards an ideal state for Sort, where they "deliver what
their customer wants, when they want it at the price they want with zero waste and
everyone safe." (Flinchbaugh, March 2004).
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6.1 mX Rule #1: Structure Every Activity
As an observed current reality, there is inconsistency in how testers are allocated; the
unstructured nature of this decision activity leads to undisciplined WIP levels and ship-
ahead executions which vary across product priorities. In the ideal state, the right tester
allocation is unambiguous and obvious; the number of testers at Sort 1, Sort 2A, Sort 2
for each product leads to a predictable result, namely the consistent flow of product to
steadily fulfill unambiguous production goals.
In order to conceptualize a more-disciplined approach to tester allocations and resulting
flow, a few realities of Sort's operational context must be considered. Figure 6.1.1 is a
depiction of the flow of P803 products in terms of a familiar "water & bath-tub" system.
Nozzle #1 (i.e. the highly-variable wafer delivery from the fab) is outside of Sort's
control, whereas Nozzle #2 (i.e. the ratio of testers on Sorti & Sort2) and Nozzle #3 (i.e.
production volume) fall within Sort's direct and indirect control. Without reliable
information about fab delivery, however, Sort is limited to achieving improved flow
times only after product enters the Sorti operation.
Fiqure 6.1.1: Sort's Inventory Flow and Points of Control for the 803 Process Technology
Nozzle #1: Fab Delivery
* outside of control
* highly-variable Nozzle #2: Ratio of Sortl-to-Sort2 Testers
* direct control
Nozzle #3: Production Volume
. < .moderate direct control with over-ship accruals
Sorti WP *. indirect control with collaborative planning
Sort2 WIP
With possible inventory control bounded by the start of Sort 1, several pull
methodologies can be considered for the structured release of work flow through
downstream operations. As one of the simplest forms of WIP control, Figure 6.1.2 shows
a conceptual Constant Work in Process, or CONWIP (Hopp and Spearman, 1996)
system. Unlike a kanban system, where movement from one operation to the next is
strictly dictated by a finite release structure, a CONWIP system allows the release of a
unit of new material into the first operation when a unit of material completes the last
operation of the process. This additional flexibility can be easier to manage than a pure
kanban system, especially with the complexity of Sort's re-entrant process flows.
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Figure 6.1.2: Structured P803 product flow with a CONWIP control on Sort 2 inventory. WIP placed in
front of the Sort 1 operation connects Sort's production requirements with their Fab supplier.
CONWIP Limit
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In general, there are many benefits from a control of WIP (pull) versus a control of
throughput (push) system. From a flow perspective, Little's Law dictates that controlling
WIP levels will translate into steady cycle times. In most cases, the introduction of WIP
discipline forces operators to undergo activities and improvements to maintain a
consistent flow of correct product mix towards fulfilling production goals; production
problems, such as testing failures or re-sorting, result in the visible stoppage of progress
and must be dealt with immediately.
In the case of Sort 23, such reductions in cycle time variability would not only help to
align the group's execution cycle (currently 14 days) with the companies' larger planning
cycle (every 7 days) but would also propel them as improvement leaders within the
Fab/Sort organization. Strategically, total cycle time through both the fab & sort
operations must be reduced to meet the increasingly-demanding lead time requirements
of the communications market.
From a tactical perspective, the maintenance of constant WIP levels (versus throughput)
can also be easier to manage and coordinate across shifts. Unlike capacity estimates, WIP
movement is directly observable and can thus be powerfully enforced through visual
management techniques. Secondly, Sort's capacity estimates depend on numerous
uncertainties such as die yield, run times, tester utilizations, and changes in product mix.
These uncertainties are hard to characterize and hence make precise capacity estimates
problematic (Hopp, Spearman, and Woodruff, 1990, p. 883).
6.2 mX Rule #2: Clearly connect every customer-supplier relationship
This mX principle advocates the proliferation of binary customer-supplier connections
where "there is only one way to make a request, and any request can only mean one
thing". In this way, responses to requests are direct, immediate and exact, and the
connection should be self-diagnostic; if a request fails, the person responsible for the link
is immediately signaled (Flinchbaugh, March 2004).
Through this ideal state lens, a significant opportunity exists to clearly connect the
product supply requirements of Sort with the fab production priorities. In exploring the
possibilities for binary request signals, the inventory before Sort 1 becomes very
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strategic; as an effective buffer between fab delivery and Sort production, this WIP can
be viewed as a supermarket shelf which is steadily drawn upon to feed Sort's production
flows. Of course, consistent downstream flow through the remaining Sort operations
must be maintained in order to retain this connection; undisciplined flow would render
the level of Sortl inventory meaningless as a communication device.
A more subtle application of the customer-supplier principle extends to Sort's obligation
to deliver their output in die quantities, not wafers. In most cases, Sort has little to no
impact over the die yield on the wafers; they merely process wafers through standardized
operations and report the fallout die and line yield data back to the fab operations. Yet
Sort's delivery performance is measured in terms of fulfilling die schedules (LIPAS), so
that any downward trends in product yield encourages Sort to boost that product's output
to compensate for the unexpected losses. As one Sort Technician boasts with pride, "We
really go to extremes down here to 'save the day' for the fab. If die yield is down, we can
end up splitting lots, performing massive tester changeovers, and jumping through all
kinds of hoops to make a production target." Reciprocally, a fab manufacturing manager
once conceded that, "the Sort floor is the last opportunity to make up for any kind of low
production. If they have the leverage to meet LIPAS, then they'd better deliver to it [for
the benefit of both Fab 23 and Sort 23]."
But as a supplier of quality information, Sort has a major responsibility to provide clear
and directed feedback to the manufacturing processes of the fab; otherwise, the true
causes of defects can be obscured and the yield inefficiencies may last. The practice of
holding Sort accountable for die schedules clearly disrupts this customer-supplier
relationship, as Sort's ongoing efforts to compensate for variable fab yields diminishes
the criticality of their quality feedback and enables downward trends to endure. In fact, a
major premise of the mX rule of customer-supplier relationships dictates that this
feedback relationship must be self-diagnostic; if Sort fails to supply its fab customer with
appropriate yield data, the consequences should manifest themselves immediately in a
causal result, namely a lower delivery of die to ADI.
Notably, W. Edwards Deming's philosophies of continous product and process
improvements center on this same kind of strict alignment of measurement and behavior.
In fact, Deming's passion for creating "constancy of purpose" and a climate free of finger
pointing (which blocks cooperative identification and solution of problems) ring
powerfully true today when viewing the current reality of the Fab-Sort relationship
(Deming, 1982, p. 17).
Hence, a measurement scheme which rewards Sort for consistent delivery of wafers, not
die, seems appropriate. In turn, fab delivery performance could be evaluated by what its
downstream customers clearly request, namely, the arrival of product-based wafers as
Sort requires them and the consistent delivery of high-yielding die to effectively replenish
ADI stock levels.
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6.3 mX Rule #3: Specify and simplify every flow
In reviewing the observed activities of three Manufacturing Technicians, I found that a
considerable amount of their time and energy is dedicated to monitoring and coordinating
WIP flow across a common fleet of 63 sorting testers. Figure 6.3.1 shows a
representation of the current networked product flows across Sort's fleet of testers. The
network flow of materials, people, and information becomes very complex and requires
electronic notes, spreadsheets, email reminders, and daily pass-down meetings to ensure
the 'best product' is processed at the right sorting operation on each tester as they become
available.
FiQure 6.3.1: Current networked product flows across Sort's sixty VHP testers.
Sort 1, Sort 2A, and Sort 2 Testers
Ship to ADI
By contrast, one might imagine a production flow in which each product follows a
standardized path across testers dedicated for Sort 1, Sort 2A, and Sort 2 operations.
Figure 6.3.2 is a visualization of how one such layout would work given a fixed location
of the baking ovens. Segregating testers by sorting operation simplifies Technician
traveling & coordination activities as well as provide visual clarity on capacity
allocations and the production status of the floor. Of course, differences in run times and
product mix will vary the number of testers required for each sorting operation on any
given week. Hence, a small cell of flexible testers is necessary to accommodate these
current realities.
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Fiqure 6.3.2: Simplified product flows. Tester capacity is segregated by Sorting operation to supply foundation
product demand. Flexible testers are available to accommodate changes in product mix.
Sort 1 Testers Sort 2A Testers Sort 2 Testers
COmmo WW M
Ovens
FAt~ Delivery _FeblTstr Ship t(
Since a majority of the testers will no longer require changeovers in sorting operations,
tester availability should also improve (the average changeover for a product requires
1/ 3rd the downtime of the average changeover in sorting operation).
6.4 Key Takeaways
The application of the mX rules to Sort's current reality creates tension for many new
possibilities for cycle time improvement and associated change towards to the Ideal State.
Of course, managing change is difficult in any organization, and the adoption of many of
these ideas is highly contingent on all the Sort shifts valuing the new common way or
process more than they value their current practices.
Next, we will see how high agreement around experimentation, with an example of the
implementation of CONWIP control, enables actionable first-steps towards change while
promoting systems thinking and tension for further improvements.
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7. EXPERIMENTATION & IMPLEMENTATION
"How often have we made a change, whether technical or organizational, and not known
whether it actually solved a problem or better served our customer? How often have we
rolled out a change as THE fix? How much more powerful would it be to roll out all
changes as controlled experiments, acknowledging that we will continue to improve upon
them, or even totally abandon them if something better is discovered? Would people be
more accepting of change if they knew that all change is an experiment, and that each
new activity, connection or flow will be scrutinized for effective and efficient delivery of
results? And that they were empowered to make changes to the change?"
- Clay Carlson, mX Core Team Leader
As one of the major leaders of the mX initiative, Clay Carlson has firsthand experience
with the challenge of implementing lean improvement ideas on the floor. By framing
proposed changes as experiments, though, mX leaders can not only create a failsafe
environment for learning but also promote a bias for immediate action. At Fab 23,
improvements are often framed by a scientific approach (i.e. the Plan, Do, Check, Act
Cycle), but then never leave the 1s' stage due to fruitless efforts to plan a perfect course of
action. Tactical experimentation (and mX Rule #4) is seen as the pathway which propels
teams out of the planning stage and into the realm of active learning.
7.1 mX Rule #4: Improve through experimentation at the point of activity
Here, an experiment is defined by an investigative change with an expected result that
steps incrementally closer to the Ideal State of production. Structured by the scientific
method, experiments at Fab 23 are defined by:
1.) An understanding of the current reality
2.) Clear instructions and clear expectations for the change
3.) Actual results that are formally checked (through data or reflection) against
expectations, and then
4.) Captured learning and the continuous refinement of the experiment.
This approach was instrumental in implementing one of the aforementioned hypotheses,
namely the tactical control of cycle times through a CONWIP release of work. With a
common understanding of Sort's current reality, a cross-functional team of
Manufacturing Technicians, an Operations Manager, a Planner, and an Industrial
Engineer first collaborated on the instructions and expectations necessary for a controlled
experiment of a pull control of flow through Sort.
7.2 Clear instructions and expectations for the change
As a first goal, the team targeted more-consistent cycle times from the start of Sort 1
through Pack/Ship for all their Tier 3 & 4 products within the P803 process flow. The
realities of scarce delivery of Tier I & Tier 2 product and the additional processing
complexity of P804 products defined this experimental subset as a necessary starting
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point. More-consistent was defined as a range of 25% above or below the operational
cycle times used by the Industrial Engineers and Planners to set Sort's delivery schedule.
With product categories and target goals selected, Little's Law proves useful again in
structuring CONWIP limits. If we assume that adequate capacity is available to meet the
scheduling demands of all products, then we can define a target WIP level Wj for each
product j that is in proportion to its throughput Tj by the sum of the operational cycle
times Ci across i operations:
#of Pr ocesses
W1 = T > Cii=t
The definition of each product's throughput Tj becomes interesting in Sort's environment
of over-production. Formally, all ship-ahead volumes should be allocated by the Tier
Priority scheme; informally, Sort's back-end shifts will run spare testers on Tier 3 and
Tier 4 product if a volume peak is imminent on those line item schedules. To
accommodate this self-smoothing practice, the target throughputs Tj can be defined by
the maximum scheduling volumes seen over a two-week horizon for each product. For
example, Figure 7.2.1 shows how the throughput TTrumbull 128 would be defined given
Trumbull 128's schedule volume (forecasted for 7 weeks).
Figure 7.2.1 'Smoothed' Throughput Targets across
a typical Product Schedule (Trumbull 128)
WW25 WW26 WW27 W W28 WW29 WW3O WW31
-"'Product Schedule -x- Target Throughput
As an example of calculating target WIP levels, let's assume that the above analysis
shows TTrumbull 128 to be 100 wafers per week in WW29. We know that Trumbull 128
product requires four process operations within the CONWIP control (Sort 1, Bake, Sort
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2, and Pack/Ship) and we also have target cycle time data for each of those operations
from the Industrial Engineering Division (changed here for confidentiality):
Product Cycle Time for Sort 1 Cycle Time for Bake Cycle Time for Sort 2 Cycle Time for Pack/
(process only) (wait and process) (wait and process) Ship (wait and process)
Trum128 4 hours 8 hours 7 hours 1 hour
In this case, the target WIP level WTrumbull 128 can be found for WW29 as follows:
WTrumunbUI128 =(00 wafers / week) x (I week / 168 hours)(4 hours +8 hours+7 hours +1 hour)
WTnimbu/I128 =12 wafers
With target throughputs Tj and corresponding target WIP levels Wj defined for all the
P803 products, the Sort Area Coordinators were given a structured list of operating rules
to dictate the regular enforcement of the CONWIP control across the Sort I, Bake, Sort2,
and Packing operations (Figure 7.2.2).
If total WIP' is approaching an upper control limit for a product, perform the following
actions as each Sort 1 operation on that product finishes:
- Change and load that finishing tester to perform any sorting operation on higher tier
product (subject to available probe cards and WIP). 2
- If no probe cards or WIP is available for a higher-tier product, change and load tester
to a Sort 1 operation for any other product with equal or lower tier priority which has
a total WIP level lower than its upper control limit.
- If all total WIP levels are approaching upper control limits across these equal or lower
tier products, change and load that tester to perform Sort2 on that same product.
If total WIP is approaching a lower control limit for a product, perform the following
actions:
- Changeover the next available spare tester that is currently performing a Sort 1
operation on a different product with a high total WIP to the Sortl operation of the
product with a low total WIP.
- If no spare testers are available, change the next available tester from running Sort 2
to run Sorti on the same product.
Total WIP is defined as the sum of inventory being processed in Sort 1, awaiting and in-
process at Bake, awaiting and in-process at Sort 2, and awaiting and in-process at
Pack/Ship. Total WIP excludes inventory awaiting Sort 1 and inventory awaiting and in-
?rocess at E-Test.
Always maintain a minimum number of testers (1) at Sortl for each product to provide
uninterrupted yield feedback to fab.
As an example of how these rules work, let's assume we have a product A that is a tier-2
product (high-priority) as well as products B and C that are both tier 3 products (low
priority). Imagine now that the amount of total WIP for product A is almost zero (as
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Figure 7.2.2 Operating Rules for CONWIP control
every available lot from the fab has already been expedited), the amount of total WIP for
product B is approaching its upper control limit, and the amount of total WIP for product
C is well within its control levels:
Product Tier Rank Total WIP Level (relative to upper and lower control limits)
A 2 None
B 3 Very high
C 3 Medium
As the next tester operating Sort 1 on product B finishes, an Area Coordinator must
decide how to re-allocate this capacity so as to reduce the inflow of WIP into product B's
CONWIP band. First, she would attempt to allocate this tester to sort more of product A -
yet the zero WIP levels for A make this action impossible. Instead, the AC would
examine product C's total WIP; since C has medium WIP, the AC would change the
finishing tester (Sort 1, product B) to support this same-tier product (Sort 1, product C).
These operating rules were carried out for a period of 5 weeks (July '04) to allow
adequate collection of cycle time data. Critically, product tier priorities remained constant
during this period.
7.3 Results versus Expectations
Figures 7.3.1 shows how these operating rules translated into structured WIP levels
within the calculated CONWIP target bands. The 25% bandwidth control allowed the
Area Coordinators flexibility in dictating rates of inventory change (through the 'nozzle'
of Sort 1 -to-Sort2 tester ratio) and hence autonomy over changeover timing. Each
excursion, or movement of WIP outside the control band, was investigated for root-cause,
and nearly every case was succinctly corrected with an appropriate changeover.
Flaure 7.3.1 Pilot CONWIP Control (Trumbull 128)
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Figure 7.3.1 Pilot CONWIP Control (Trumbull 64)
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Figure 7.3.1 Pilot CONWIP Control (Trumbull 32)
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By structuring the level of inventory in proportion to throughput volume, Sort expected
decreased cycle time variability for each of these product families. Figures 7.3.2 show a
comparison of the cycle times for these products for both a pre-pilot period (June '04)
and during the pilot (July '04). Examining the cycle times of the Sort operations before
and during the pilot CONWIP control reveal a few key points:
0 The major differences in cycle times across the operations stem from the variable
queue times before Sort 1 and Sort 2. In the case of Trumbull 128, the total cycle
time through Sort seems to have remained unchanged; decreased wait times
before Sort 2 have been substituted for increased wait times in front of Sort 1.
Note that evidence of this zero-sum trade-off is only clear when fab delivery-rates
are roughly consistent.
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* The CONWIP control dictates the cycle time from Sort 1 to Pack/Ship be
consistent across all Tier 3 & 4 products. Here, the Trumbull 64 and Trumbull 32
queue times before Sort2 increased to match the common drumbeat. And
although the variability in Sort2 queue time looks equivalent for Trumbull 64, we
see a solid reduction in the same variability for the cases of Trumbull 32 and
Trumbull 128.
* Since P804 products and Tier 1/ Tier 2 P803 products were outside the scope of
the experiment, no change was expected for their cycle times. While there
appeared to be no significant change in queue times in the P804 product flows,
interestingly, Trumbull 256 (the only P803 product above a Tier 3 status) shows
July queue times which are markedly lower than comparable June levels. It would
seem the prescriptive operating rules (with a structured priority for allocating
spare testers by Tier category) translated to faster flow of a priority product i.e.
more testers were immediately placed on Trumbull 256 product versus building
up excessive Sort 1 or Sort 2 inventory on products with lower Tier priority.
Figure 7.3.2 Reduced Variability in Sort2 Cycle Times
(Trumbull 128 in June '04 vs. July'04)
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Figure 7.3.2 Reduced Variability in Sort2 Cycle Times
(Trumbull 64 in June '04 vs. July'04)
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Figure 7.3.2 Reduced Variability In Sort2 Cycle Times
(Trumbull 256 in June '04 vs. July'04)
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Per original expectations, the number of setups shows some increase during this pilot
period (Figure 7.3.3). Product changes appear to make up a majority of the increase,
consistent with the structured Area Coordinator operating rules (rules give priority in
changing product over a sorting operation).
Figure 7.3.3 Setup Changes on VHP Testers
WW6 WW7 WW8 WWO WW1O WWII WWI2 WWI3 WWI4 W1S WWIS WWI7 WWIO WW19 WW20 WW21 WW22 WW23 WW24 WW2S WW26 WW27 WW24 WW29 WW3O WW31
JULY PILOT
E Change in Product 0 Change in Sort Operation
As a percentage of total availability, however, changeover time remained minimal. Sort
showed consistently high utilization metrics well-above internal benchmarks during the
period (Figure 5.4.1) and executed a LIPAS of 97% (out of the total 33 line items, only I
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product delivery was missed due to a disposition hold stemming from an error in a new
testing program).
Notably, most Manufacturing Technicians viewed the increase in tester changeovers with
criticism. Changeovers are currently cumbersome and time-intensive, and increases are
commonly seen as a burden on Technician availability. As one Technician argued,
"Where is the waste reduction in creating more flexes? If anything, we need to decrease
changeovers [to minimize waste] - both to maximize utilization and reduce the labor
content in the job."
7.4 Learnings and Refinement
As a first experiment in structured WIP control, the Sort floor executed the pilot change
without terrible difficulty; one might argue that simply structuring these products flows to
be consistently within the given planning times seems trivial. However, the real power of
this change is not to be found in the absolute results but in how those results are
interpreted, learned from, and directed towards the next level of refinement.
For Sort, there are several avenues available for continuous improvement upon this WIP
control. A principle opportunity lies in extending the principles of pull across Sort's
entire product suite. While Tier I and 2 products may be continually subject to expedited,
variable flows, structuring the queues in P804 product flow seems straightforward. With
one additional Bake-Sort process loop, the natural CONWIP level would begin at the
start of Sortl processing and extend to Pack/Ship, thereby controlling to total queue time
in front of Sort2A and Sort2 to be in constant proportion to throughput.
Once the floor has demonstrated steady cycle times across its products, the natural next
step is to start incrementally decreasing target cycle times below those anticipated by
planning. In this manner, cycle time will systematically be lowered, forcing an increased
diligence in WIP control and consensus throughput targets across front-end and back-end
shifts.
Perhaps most challenging will be a final push to decrease the WIP control bandwidths.
Set as a percentage of target throughputs, narrowing this range would increase the
product changeovers, the labor content of the Manufacturing Technicians, and raise the
criticality of each setup timeliness and quality.
7.5 Key Takeaways
As these next refinements are carried out, Sort may run into operating constraints that
will lead them to better-coordinate their structured WIP flow with both back-end fab
operations along with the current methods practiced by Planning and Industrial
Engineers. In the longer term, all the operational areas at Fab/Sort 23 will feel pressure to
lower their cycle times if they want to compete successfully in the communication
market. So as cycle time becomes a more critical indicator of performance, Sort should
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also be in a position to coach the rest of the fab organization from their experience with
structured WIP management.
Of course, many barriers will likely be encountered along the way. It is helpful then to
highlight many of the organizational barriers to 'lean change' experienced during the
CONWIP implementation as representative of the larger culture and complexity of Fab
23.
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8. BARRIERS TO MX AT INTEL
"My greatest challenge [is] "to lead the organization as if I had no power." In other
words, shape the organization not through the power of will or dictate, but rather through
example, through coaching and through understanding and helping others to achieve their
goals. This, I truly believe, is the role of management in a healthy, thriving, work
environment."
- Gary Convis, President, Toyota Motor Manufacturing Kentucky (Convis, July 2004)
In order to replicate the mX changes in Sort to other operational areas at Fab 23, a close
examination of the barriers encountered with the CONWIP control change seems highly
appropriate. In this chapter, these barriers will be described in the larger context of the
company's organizational design and culture.
8.1 Organizational Design
We have already examined the case where Sort's operating metrics (i.e. weekly tester
utilization, subject to delivery requirements) did not immediately align with the strategic
goals of the mX project. Consequently, the latent wastes of overproduction remained
safely outside Sort's paradigm of success. Notably, Intel has recently dedicated an
internal team of resources towards re-examining the company's fab-wide metrics in an
effort to re-align daily behaviors with the company's critical performance objectives.
Additionally, we can highlight some organizational barriers that are intrinsic to the fab's
formal organizational structure and the design of the MT job.
8.1.1 Organizational Structure
Sort's formal organization (Figure 4.2) is representative of many of the other functional
areas in the fab. A key aspect of mX is delivering improvements through standardized
work rules that enable coordinated improvements across multiple shifts. However, the
management structure of the floor is succinctly divided; oftentimes Operating Managers
run their shifts in a unique (and sometimes contradictory) fashion, and rarely meet in
person to facilitate coordination. Furthermore, structured communication between the
front-end and back-end shifts is limited to emails, web-tools, and electronic post-it notes -
leading each group to finger point when production problems occur (thereby blocking
cooperative identification and solution of problems). As such, any attempts to standardize
work will be sure to require some external resources to coach, reinforce, and coordinate
the increased discipline. In many ways, I found myself fulfilling this need during the pilot
implementation of WIP control - revealing a very palpable gap between the fab's
organizational design and mX.
Another challenge for executing mX activities within this organizational structure is the
bureaucracy between functional divisions. As an example, I was tasked with procuring
and installing a second clean-room printer in the fab to help reduce MT travel distances.
A process-based view of this work would show a Byzantine system of hand-offs,
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redundant processing, and delays as simple decision-items get passed back and forth
among the Manufacturing, Micro-contamination, Manufacturing Systems, IT, Industrial
Engineering, and Automation groups. Notably, none of these departments questioned the
validity or value of the proposed change - in fact, everyone I worked with felt this printer
should have been provided for the MTs a long time ago. Despite everyone's willing
cooperation, the job took 56 work days from assignment to completion with usually one
communication, meeting, or activity occurring daily. Imagine the difficulty of change
when the value of a similar cross-functional task is not as widely accepted or understood?
8.1.2 Job Design of the Manufacturing Technicians
In order to promote flexibility and higher labor productivity, MTs formally operate under
a "single-job" concept. Essentially, all MT's are expected to share the same job
description, tool skills, and proactive attitudes about taking ownership of problems on the
floor. In reality, many MTs will differentiate themselves by developing highly-desired
skills in equipment maintenance and diagnostic firefighting. These "Super-MTs" are
sometimes rewarded with promotions and additional training. Other aspects of the
Technicians job (diligent WIP movement, team coordination, housekeeping, etc.) are
activities which have not been historically rewarded and attract marginal respect from
management.
This tension between official "single-job" policy and actual specialized practices creates
an interesting environment for mX change. In one sense, informal job specificity would
imply more individualistic practices and greater barriers to standardized work. On the
other hand, the ability to coordinate the few experts in each shift might be an effective
team to spearhead structured practices. Certainly having people with deep expertise
combined with breadth of experience is a terrific asset when presented with the systems-
thinking challenges of mX. Nevertheless, the nondescript treatment of routine tasks
presents a significant barrier when petitioning commitment for Visual Controls, 5S, or
Standardized Work Instructions.
8.2 The Intel Culture
8.2.1 The Different Symbols of mX at Fab 23
The mX project holds different symbolic meaning for different people in the fab. In
questioning the top leadership at F23, one hears that mX symbolizes great promise as it
may help capture and extend the "special sauce" of recent cost-cutting successes to the
rest of the factory operations and the MT environment. Some middle managers feel mX
is about "working smarter, not harder" and is essentially an opportunity for them to help
create more work-life balance among their subordinates (if I reduce the waste in their
jobs, my people will have more time to spend outside of work). But if one were to
directly ask those whom mX impacts the most - the MTs on the floor - one might hear
two criticisms:
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1.) mX is about somebody taking credit for what Technicians have been doing all
along (suggesting a breakdown in communicating the mX message to the floor)
2.) mX is a flavor of the month'; the initiative will never last without immediate,
tangible results to warrant the resources
This pressure on results has created a very different symbol of mX within the mX project
leaders: one of battle. In communicating the vision of mX at Fab 23, one mX leader
writes, "Human beings are the value. Profit is the goal and our reason for existence.
Waste is the enemy. mX is the weapon. In our continuous reach for the goal, we will
safely pursue and vanquish the enemy with the weapon of mX." In the same spirit, all mX
Champions wear badges that boldly display a sword emblem and the words "Waste is the
Enemy" on them. Perhaps the symbol reflects the leaders' frustration in facilitating
systematic waste elimination among the MTs; the natural difficulty and hard work of
negotiating a change on the floor combined with the pressure for results could easily be
abstracted into a fab-wide "battle" for improvement.
The inconsistency in symbols across different groups also suggests an ambiguity in the
way mX has been communicated to the organization. Formally, mX is broadcast as one
of Fab 23's three 'Must-Do' Strategic Objectives:
1.) Sustain operational excellence on [current production commitments]
2.) Flawless execution on [a new process technology ramp-up]
3.) Make mX a way of life
The language of the last objective is important; working towards a certain "way of life"
can mean different things to different groups (just as current ways of life can obviously be
very different around the fab). The ambiguity of this communication may not only lead to
different interpretations of mX but also makes the alignment of daily behavior with the
strategy somewhat difficult. If an MT works extraordinary hard over the course of a week
to help standardize the best WIP staging policy across shifts, has he just made mX a
normal part of his job? If an engineer works to diagnose a yield disposition (a kind of
work she has done for years) and successfully improves quality- is that not an mX way of
life for her? Which is the behavior that supports the new mX objective, and why doesn't
the other behavior qualify?
8.2.2 The fit of mX within the Intel's Values
The introduction of any cultural initiative which falls outside of Intel's current value
rubric seems somehow absurd, as Intel's corporate-wide norms are powerfully articulated
across the organization. Like cultural road-signs, the values of
Risk-taking Great place to work Quality
Discipline Results-oriented Customer Orientation
are visually reinforced on ID badges, office posters, calendars, coffee mugs, and even
mouse-pads. Although most of these core values can be easily related to the mX project
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(lean principles reinforce a similar emphasis on quality, internal customer-supplier
relationships, structured activities, and job fulfillment) it still seems peculiar to suggest
mX is on par with these long-time pillars of Intel Excellence.
The only existing norm which requires a more-robust interpretation is the results-oriented
pillar, as it typically represents Intel's emphasis on producing causal data or metrics as a
proof of delivered value. The hazard for mX lies in the misalignment of delivery
horizons; Intel expectsfast results (usually as a means of survival in the electronics
industry), whereas many lean improvements can take longer to materialize. The tension
between "preoccuptations of today [without] ensuring improvements for tomorrow" (W.
Edwards Deming, 1982, p. 18) is not a new phenomina, and Fab 23 surely struggles with
this classic dynamic amid their rapid-clockspeed culture.
8.2.3 An aside about mX coaching
The role of those who may help coach mX thinking among their constituents is especially
precarious given Intel's value offast results. With a new production ramp-up imminent,
nearly everyone at Fab 23 is very busy fulfilling the duties that are essential for this
mission-critical success. However, one usually finds that coaching mX activities is in and
of itself a full-time commitment; the energy and time required to teach and demonstrate
new ways of thinking is certain to be exhausting and burdensome to those with a regular
roster of other responsibilities. Worse, the return for this invested time isn't nearly as
immediate as many of the other projects at Fab 23 (Figure 8.1.3 shows a conceptual delay
with mX work relative to traditional Intel activities).
Figure 8.1.3 Performance delay for mi projects
mX work
CL regular tasks
Time
In order to escape the Catch-22 ("mX will free up my time through efficiency gains, but I
don't have time right now to do mX"), mX coaches must somehow overcome the initial
"add-on" barrier. Notably, Fab 23 does have mX Champions that are highly-effective at
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being coaches and leaders of mX practices in addition to their full-time responsibilities.
What is the "secret sauce" that enables them to be especially effective beyond the initial
investment barriers?
8.3 Conclusions
Examining Fab 23 from both the organizational and cultural perspectives crystallizes
some very clear challenges for the mX initiative. Central to these barriers may be Intel's
critical need for hyper-speed results that align with their paradigms of success. As noted
before, communicating mX as a "Must-Do Way of Life for 2004" sets a short-term
expectation which is not only ambiguous (and thus difficult to execute-to, even with an
alignment in performance metrics) but also asynchronous with the reasonable timeline for
a lean transformation. As one planning manager predicted, "Everyone here is focused on
individual projects completed within a year. Since there is no way lean is a one-year
project, our reward system just won't support it." Perhaps even more insidious is the way
speed can precipitate same-old thinking about problems. As Prof. Jan Klein writes, "The
need for speed leads one to fall back on what one knows or has tried in the past." (Klein, ,
October 2004, Chapter 2 p. 7)
Furthermore, the must-succeed nature of this expectation, along with the heavy norm for
results-oriented work, creates a very challenging atmosphere for lean exploration and
learning; the value in practicing new ways of thinking is just not accepted without
immediate data or results that move existing metrics. Worse, one manager expects that,
"Lean will bring all sorts of benefits to Intel: higher quality, cycle time reductions,
increased safety and labor productivity - it should move all our metrics." How can the
critical reinforcing feedback for specific change efforts be targeted when it's being
measured across such a diffused and grandiose set of metrics?
To be sure, changing ways of thinking (both one's own and others) is an enormous initial
commitment that takes hard work and leadership savvy. At its essence, the demands of
making mX change happen - the daily coaching, the inventing solutions as you go, the
mix of tough negotiations with mutual cooperation - are challenges requiring both heavy
systems thinking and personal persistence. If mX is to flourish at Fab 23, then leveraging
the talent of the formal and informal leaders at the facility is most crucial. As one OM
succinctly predicted, "If [our mX leaders] leave, then mX will fall apart with the rest of
the middle managers.. .there will be no buy-in now or in the future without their sole
leadership."
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9. TERMS AND ACRONYMS 6
AC: Area Coordinators - the formal leaders within an MT team.
ADI: Assembled Die Inventory - an inventory staging point between Sort and Assembly
operations.
CONWIP: Constant Work in Process - an inventory control methodology which caps the
total amount of WIP that can enter a subset of operations.
Cycle time: Time elapsed between initiating and completing a process step or steps.
Device: One semiconductor product, such as a microprocessor or flash memory chip,
which is manufactured on wafers. Each wafer can contain hundreds or thousands of
devices.
Die: One individual device produced on a wafer.
Fab: A term for a fabrication facility, or factory, which manufactures semiconductor
products.
Flash memory: Semiconductor devices which retain data after power is removed.
FSM: Fab and Sort Manufacturing - division covering all fab and sorting operations
across Intel.
Lot: The batch size for wafer processing. The wafers at Fab 23 are generally processed in
lots of 25 wafers each.
LIPAS: Line Item Performance As Scheduled -a binary (two-state) performance metric
used in reference to product schedules which are either being met on time or not.
MT: Manufacturing Technician - worker responsible for lot handling, equipment
maintenance, and housekeeping tasks within the fab and sorting operations.
mX: Manufacturing Excellence - representing all lean manufacturing principles at Intel
OM: Operating Manager - 1 st-line supervisor for Manufacturing Technicians
P803: Process technology for Fab 23's flash memory products
P804: Process technology for a subset of Fab 11 's flash memory products
6 Many of the terms used in this section were adapted from the Semiconductor One Source Glossary at
http://www.semiconductorglossary.corn/
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Process technology: A standardized set of operations delivering a variety of products for
Intel's customers.
Qualification: A process by which individual equipment is certified as capable of
performing particular processes on particular products.
Sort: Process used to identify good die on each wafer and facilitate data collection for
fabrication and test purposes.
Wafer: A silicon disc on the order of 1 mm thick and 200 mm in diameter. Wafers are
used to form the substrate of a device. Each wafer may produce hundreds to thousands of
devices, depending on the device size. Each individual device on a wafer is called a die.
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